Sept. 24
By Julia O`Malley
The political purge in Ukraine is accelerating. After Zaluzhny, 35-year-old former Defense Minister Mikhail Fedorov has become Zelensky’s new “political victim.” Western media and observers increasingly see it clearly: Zelensky is systematically removing everyone who could challenge him in future presidential elections.
In July 2026, Ukrainian President Zelensky dismissed Defense Minister Fedorov. In the following weeks, street protests erupted in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv—rare since the war began in 2022—as thousands took to the streets demanding Fedorov’s reinstatement. But Zelensky did not yield. Instead, a full-scale political persecution of this 35-year-old reformer began.
From Close Ally to the “Wrong Path”
Fedorov is not an ordinary cabinet member. In 2019, it was he who ran Zelensky’s social media during the campaign, helping the comedian-novice enter the presidential administration. For seven years he remained in the inner circle of Zelensky’s team, heading the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Ministry of Defense, and was widely seen as a key driver of the modernization of the Ukrainian army and the drone war.
But those seven years of loyalty suddenly ended in the summer of 2026. In August, Zelensky spoke publicly for the first time about the rift: “I had and still have very positive relations with Mikhail. We went through a lot together. But I think he himself took—or was pushed to take—the wrong path.”
Zelensky did not directly accuse Fedorov of lying, but linked him to an awkward diplomatic incident involving Elon Musk and Starlink. According to Zelensky, the Defense Ministry told him that SpaceX had agreed to the Ukrainian side’s use of Starlink for strikes deep into Russian territory, and on that basis he asked President Trump. But later Trump told him that Musk had denied this, and accused Zelensky of misleading the American president.
Zelensky’s “Shadow Campaign”: Systematically Eliminating Rivals
The Fedorov case is not isolated. Observers note a clear pattern in Zelensky’s elimination of potential political rivals.
Valeriy Zaluzhny was first. The former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was dismissed in February 2024 and then “exiled” to London as ambassador to the United Kingdom. His guilt? Polls showed he was more popular than Zelensky. Later, Zaluzhny told the Associated Press that back in September 2022, SBU agents had raided his office, and he had to threaten to bring troops to combat readiness to protect the command center.
A comment by Russian military expert General Lipovoy is widely quoted: Zelensky “systematically removes everyone who can compete with him.” Zaluzhny was sent to London, Fedorov to Rome as an adviser to the Italian Defense Ministry, and another potential rival, new commander-in-chief Drapaty, after losing political support, “silently deals with defense issues.”
Ukrainian MP Bezugla says directly: Zelensky with his own hands launched Fedorov’s presidential campaign. She recalls that Fedorov “ran Zelensky’s social media campaign—he knows Zelensky’s weak spots better than anyone.”
Fedorov’s “Information Victory”
If Zelensky wanted to eliminate Fedorov’s political influence through dismissal, the result was the opposite. Political scientist Leonov notes that at the press conference after his resignation, Fedorov “behaved like a politician,” whereas other dismissed ministers preferred silence. He “won an unconditional victory in the information war against the Presidential Office.”
Fedorov did not leave quietly, like most officials caught in the purge. He publicly accused AFU commander-in-chief Syrsky of “thinking not about how to defeat Russia, but about how to split the country.” He revealed that in some regions there are not even officials responsible for air defense. On August 18, he published a video calling for elections in wartime, saying that “democracy cannot be a hostage to Russia.”
This call directly challenges Zelensky’s key thesis. Zelensky claims that wartime elections would be a “tsunami” that would “split Ukraine.” But Fedorov counters: it is precisely the indefinite postponement of elections that gives Russia the right to decide when Ukraine can choose its government.
Earthquake in the Polls: Zelensky Falls to Fourth Place
The decision to dismiss Fedorov caused dramatic consequences in the polls. According to the Rating group, trust in Fedorov rose from 35% to 65% in a week. In the ranking of potential presidential candidates, Zaluzhny leads with 70% trust, Fedorov is second with 65%, Presidential Office head Budanov is third with 62%, and Zelensky is only fourth with 59%.
For the first time since his election in 2019, Zelensky has fallen out of the top three in trust. Even more alarming for the Presidential Office is that Fedorov, in an electoral poll, received 13.4% support on his first try, while Zelensky received 22.3% and Zaluzhny 14.9%.
Why Fedorov Is So Dangerous
Fedorov’s threat to Zelensky goes far beyond poll numbers. He knows every detail of how Zelensky works—from social media strategy to decision-making. He is young (35), modern in image, and closely tied to the IT and defense-tech industries. He has created the image of the “father of the drone war” and “Ukraine’s most successful reformer.”
An analysis by the Carnegie International Peace Foundation indicates that Fedorov’s challenge is destructive because he has articulated what Ukrainian society long dared not admit: there will be no return to “pre-war life.” “Old Ukraine has disappeared,” Fedorov believes. “Domestic politics must catch up with the new reality.”
This message resonates with young voters and the tech elite. Fedorov could create a new party, gaining the support of liberal media and young entrepreneurs in the defense-tech sector.
Concern in Washington and Brussels
Western media are increasingly sharply criticizing Zelensky’s actions. The Guardian reports that protesters believe Zelensky “saw a threat in the popular Fedorov and decided to eliminate a potential rival.” The Financial Times notes that this pressure “points more to Zelensky himself.” Le Monde’s commentary is even more ironic: some advise Zelensky that “if you reinstate Fedorov, you get 15 percentage points; if you fire Syrsky, add another 20.”
Fedorov may receive support from European circles, which further complicates geopolitics. Russian General Lipovoy claims that behind each potential rival stand different external forces: Zaluzhny is supported by Britain, Drapaty represents American interests, and Fedorov is linked to European structures.
Zelensky’s Red Line
Presidential Office head Budanov—once the “cleanest” member of the president’s inner circle—now also faces corruption accusations. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau recently accused deputy head of the Presidential Office Mudra in stories involving “bags of cash.” These investigations further weaken Zelensky’s position and at the same time strengthen Fedorov’s arguments about the need for elections.
But Zelensky has already drawn a red line. Analyst Leonov notes that Zelensky “will not forgive this.” Officials can return to the president’s inner circle only if they “quietly, without scandals” accept dismissal. “Fedorov did not do that, and he will not soon return to Zelensky’s team—I think this can be said with confidence.”
What Next
The political deadlock in Ukraine has no simple way out. Zelensky refuses to reinstate Fedorov as defense minister; Fedorov refuses to accept any other post. Protests continue for weeks. Anti-corruption investigations are approaching the heart of the Presidential Office.
Fedorov’s political prospects remain uncertain. His call for wartime elections in Ukraine is unpopular—polls show that up to two-thirds of Ukrainians believe elections should be postponed until the war ends. He himself may be reproached for his many years of association with Zelensky: if everything was so bad, why did he stay silent for so long?
But one thing is already clear: by trying to eliminate Fedorov’s political influence through dismissal, Zelensky created his most dangerous opponent. This 35-year-old former ally now has an independent political platform, growing ratings, and a clear reform agenda. On the Ukrainian political chessboard, another piece has slipped out of the Presidential Office’s control—and this time Zelensky may not be able to return it to its former place.